East Africa ushers in the New Year carrying unresolved political, economic wounds

Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan takes the oath of office during her inauguration in Dodoma, on November 3, 2025. [File, Standard]

As 2025 ends, East Africa enters the New Year weighed down by unresolved political tensions, shrinking civic space, and a rapidly shifting global order that has left the region more exposed than at any point in the past decade.

From Nairobi to Dodoma, Kampala to Kigali, and Juba to Bujumbura, the year has been defined less by reform or democratic renewal than by State consolidation, electoral manipulation, and the tightening grip of security establishments on public life.

Across the region, governments faced rising economic pressure, youth discontent, and diminishing fiscal space.

Yet rather than responding with structural reform, inclusion, or accountability, ruling elites increasingly turned inward, relying on repression, surveillance, and legal engineering to maintain control.

These domestic trends were reinforced by a changing geopolitical environment, particularly the return of the US to a more explicitly transactional foreign policy under President Donald Trump’s second administration and the global retreat from human rights and democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority.

One of the most consequential developments that shaped East Africa in 2025 was the restructuring of the US engagement with Africa. Under President Trump’s renewed “America First” doctrine, Washington accelerated its shift away from values-driven development partnerships — signalled by the scaling back and restructuring of traditional USAID programmes after he took office in January.

This recalibration became increasingly visible as the year progressed late in 2025, the US administration announced expanded restrictions on diplomatic engagement and mobility affecting several African countries, including Tanzania, while South Sudan was effectively locked out altogether.

These measures, officially framed around governance failures, security risks, and compliance concerns, sent a strong signal that access to US engagement would be selective, conditional, and transactional.

At the same time, Washington continued to scale back democracy support initiatives across the continent.

Longstanding governance, accountability, and civil society support mechanisms were either reduced, folded into security frameworks, or replaced by bilateral agreements designed to deliver measurable outcomes aligned with US strategic interests.

Analysts at Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have warned that this approach weakens external leverage on governance and human rights, while rewarding short-term stability over long-term democratic resilience.

For East African governments confronting domestic dissent, this shift proved consequential. With reduced diplomatic scrutiny and fewer governance conditions attached to international cooperation, the incentive to pursue reform diminished.

The changing US posture was perhaps most clearly illustrated when on December 4, Washington and Nairobi signed a five-year, $2.5 billion (Sh325 billion) Health Cooperation Framework, committing the United States to provide up to $1.6 billion (Sh206 billion) in health funding, contingent upon Kenya increasing its own domestic health expenditure by $850 million (Sh Sh110)billion over the same period.

The framework, however, quickly became controversial within Kenya. Annexes on data sharing and specimen sharing triggered legal and political challenges, with critics arguing that the provisions granted the US intrusive access to Kenya’s national health data systems.

A draft legal opinion by an advocate, Dr Mugambi Laibuta, warned that the agreement could violate Kenya’s Data Protection Act and Digital Health Act by allowing real-time access to sensitive national data without adequate safeguards or parliamentary oversight.

Suspended its implementation

Barely days after the agreement was signed, the High Court in Nairobi suspended its implementation following petitions alleging constitutional violations.

Domestically, Kenya’s 2025 was shaped by a volatile mix of popular mobilisation and State repression. The defining events were the Gen Z-led protests that resurfaced in June and July, initially sparked by Opposition to the 2024 Finance Bill but quickly evolving into a broader indictment of the political system.

Protesters articulated grievances over the cost of living, unemployment, corruption, police brutality, and what many young Kenyans described as their exclusion from economic and political opportunity.

The movement reached a symbolic climax on Saba Saba, July 7 — a date historically associated with Kenya’s struggle for multiparty democracy.

Demonstrations erupted across Nairobi and several counties, drawing thousands of young people into the streets.

What distinguished the protests was not only their scale, but their leaderless, decentralised nature, coordinated largely through digital platforms and informal networks.

The State response was swift and severe. Amnesty International, Article 19, and local human rights organisations documented the use of live ammunition, mass arrests, enforced disappearances, and the deployment of paramilitary police units.

President William Ruto’s public rhetoric during this period reflected a security-first posture. Warnings against attempts to “overthrow” his government were interpreted by rights groups as signalling tolerance for heavy-handed tactics.

Observers noted a marked deterioration in Kenya’s record on freedom of assembly and expression, particularly alarming given the country’s historical role as a relative outlier in a region increasingly hostile to dissent.

By the final quarter of 2025, however, the Kenya Kwanza administration strategy shifted. Large-scale protests subsided, not through dialogue or reform, but through deterrence, prosecutions, and sustained policing. The administration adopted a lower-profile public posture, refocusing on economic messaging and enticements framed as empowerment programmes, investor confidence, and international diplomacy.

Political analysts described this as a strategic restraint rather than reconciliation. With the 2027 General Election on the horizon, the government appeared intent on preventing further unrest while consolidating control.

If Kenya illustrated managed repression, Tanzania represented its most extreme expression. The October 2025 General Election and its aftermath constituted the region’s gravest political and human rights crisis of the year.

Opposition party

President Samia Suluhu Hassan of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) was declared the winner with an officially reported 98 per cent of the vote, following a poll boycotted by the main opposition party, Chadema.

Observer missions from the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) stopped short of endorsing the process.

The AU cited irregularities and a restrictive political environment, while SADC highlighted challenges that affected electoral integrity. Their cautious language, however, did little to mitigate the fallout.

Protests erupted in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, and Arusha. The State response was unprecedented. Security forces imposed curfews, restricted internet access, and used lethal force to disperse demonstrators.

Human rights organisations reported mass arrests, enforced disappearances, and credible allegations of extrajudicial killings. While official casualty figures remain disputed, independent accounts describe the crackdown as the worst human rights crisis in Tanzania’s modern history.

In November, a coalition of Tanzanian civil society organisations and international legal experts filed a communication with the International Criminal Court, urging the Prosecutor to open a preliminary examination into alleged crimes against humanity.

Former Prime Minister and retired judge Joseph Warioba publicly endorsed calls for an international investigation, stating that Tanzania’s own mechanisms, including the judiciary, lacked the independence to conduct credible inquiries.

International repercussions followed. On November 8, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller announced “an immediate review of all bilateral assistance to Tanzania” citing credible reports of gross human rights violations.

The European Union Parliament passed a resolution on November 21, calling for “targeted sanctions against officials responsible for the violence and for the suspension of Tanzania from the Everything but Arms trade framework.”

Yet the crisis also exposed a deeper regional failure. Morris Odhiambo, chair of the East African Civil Society Organisations Forum, says that African human rights institutions, constrained by political considerations and the doctrine of non-interference, were largely absent.

Investor confidence

Beyond politics, the crackdown damaged Tanzania’s economy. Internet restrictions disrupted commerce, tourism declined, and investor confidence weakened.

For neighbours such as Kenya, Uganda or Rwanda, instability in Tanzania disrupted cross-border trade and raised concerns about the resilience of regional supply chains.

Tanzania President Samia Suluhu, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and Kenya's William Ruto. [File, Standard]

While Tanzania reeled from post-election violence, Uganda spent 2025 preparing for its mid-January 2026 General Election under conditions many observers have likened to a managed coronation.

President Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power since 1986, confirmed his bid for a seventh term. The political field remained heavily tilted in his favour.

Yet for many, especially young Ugandans, particularly those in the informal economy, the slogan rang hollow

Rodgers, a 28-year-old boda boda rider, captured the sentiment succinctly. After nearly a decade repaying an exorbitant loan for his motorcycle, which will be close to unroadworthy by the time it is fully paid, he asked rhetorically: “So what exactly are we protecting?” His question reflects a broader generational frustration, as boda boda riding remains the primary, yet precarious, source of livelihood for many young Ugandans.

Throughout 2025, Uganda’s opposition parties faced arrests, harassment, and media restrictions.

In April, Parliament passed the Military Courts (Amendment) Bill, explicitly legalising the trial of civilians in military courts. Human rights organisations condemned the move, warning it entrenched a parallel justice system designed to neutralise dissent.

The opposition National Unity Platform (NUP) claims hundreds of its supporters are currently detained under military jurisdiction.

  In November, the Uganda Communications Commission ordered all online news platforms and bloggers to obtain an annual licence, a move the Committee to Protect Journalists said was designed to stifle independent reporting ahead of the poll.

Observers warn that Uganda is entering a phase of late-stage authoritarian entrenchment, where electoral processes persist but meaningful competition is severely constrained.

South Sudan remained politically stagnant throughout 2025. Implementation of the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement stalled, with key provisions unmet. In October, the US imposed new sanctions on senior officials for undermining peace efforts, effectively deepening the country’s isolation. Excluded from new US partnership frameworks, South Sudan stands as a basket case of disengagement through governance failure.

East Africa enters 2026 under mounting economic and political strain.

According to the World Bank’s December 2025 economic update, regional growth is projected to slow to 3.8 per cent in 2026, down from 4.5 per cent in the previous year.

Social pressure

Public debt remains high, averaging an estimated 68 per cent of GDP across Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, limiting fiscal space at a time of rising social pressure.

Shifts in external partnerships are compounding these constraints.

The International Monetary Fund projects Kenya’s debt servicing costs will absorb about 62 per cent of government revenue in 2026, significantly narrowing room for social spending or economic stimulus.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation data shows cereal prices across East Africa averaging 38 per cent above five-year norms as of November 2025, while fuel prices have risen by an estimated 27 per cent year-on-year.

Taken together, the events of 2025 reveal a regional pattern likely to carry into 2026.

Kenya’s calibrated repression, Tanzania’s violent post-election consolidation, and Uganda’s tightly constrained electoral process follow a familiar script of weakened judicial independence, security forces deployed as instruments of political control, and electoral institutions subordinated to executive power.