Twenda wapi as we inch towards 2027?
Opinion
By
Kivutha Kibwana
| Jun 18, 2026
During this year’s National Prayer Breakfast, President Dr William Samoei Ruto divulged if in 2027 he suffers a ballot box setback, he will honourably concede defeat. He also challenged the opposition to do likewise, if trounced.
Undeniably this declaration exemplifies the ethos of democratic, transparent, free, fair and credible elections. However, for both the President and the Government-in-waiting, the proof of the pudding, as they say, is in the eating.
Why then the pervasive national gloom and uncertainty as we approach the 14th general election since independence?
I proceed, first, by posing: How is the electoral chess board currently playing out? True to Kenya’s colonial and post-colonial history, electoral mobilization driven by ethnic consciousness, still holds sway, with issue based politics taking a back seat. Even the current embryonic coalitions are largely aggregations of vote baskets of what Wangari Maathai styled micro-nations. Such vote marshalling aims to achieve ‘tranny of numbers’ and therefore the winning 50 percent plus one presidential threshold. To organize inter-ethnically through bona fide agenda setting politics is thus considered unnecessary heavy lifting. To mobilize around tribe as opposed to policy is therefore deemed the elite preference.
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Let us sample some of the nascent political formations.
President Ruto’s foremost vote catchment region is the expansive Rift Valley among Kalenjin peoples and other kinfolk (although the populous Kipsigis are restive, and the region’s migrant vote for incumbency is not assured), North Eastern Kenya, Upper Eastern Kenya, recently naturalized stateless groups such as Nubians, Makonde, Shona and Pemba, and other minority indigenous ethnicities.
After Raila Odinga’s surprise detour into the broad based government, the President believed he had bagged Luo Nyanza even if some diehard Baba supporters are shunning voter registration and possibly 2027 voting citing they only had a social contract with Agwambo.
Babu Owino, James Orengo and others seem to have convinced the majority of Raila Odinga’s supporters that they are the legitimate heirs of Baba. Matters are further complicated by the fact that Kisii Nyanza seems be to queuing behind Matiangi and Onyonka with governor Arati losing his simba clout.
However, ODM’s bifurcation into two feuding factions: Linda Mwananchi ODM and Linda Ground ODM is forcing the head of state to return to the drawing board.
During the pre-2022 period the then deputy president insisted, as he now continues to urge as president, that his coalition partners such as Moses Wetangula, Musalia Mudavadi, Amason Kingi, Alfred Mutua, Ali Ibrahim Roba and others collapse their respective parties to pave way to a monolith. Some heeded, others resisted. Many believed their political tents were sanctuaries for respective ethnic blocs and personal insurance during a season of turbulent political headwinds.
Interestingly, Moses Wetangula thwarted the dissolution of his Ford-Kenya party. Today such a decision, it can be hypothesized, was fortuitous for the Kenya Kwanza fraternity given the gathering opposition storm in Western Kenya led by Edwin Sifuna, George Natembeya of the Tawe Movement, Godfrey Osotsi, Mukhisa Kituyi, Eugene Wamalwa, Caleb Amisi, Okiya Omtatah, Reuben Kigame and others.
Without doubt, the president is likely to invest heavily in Western Kenya, including dangling the deputy presidency to the Mulembe Nation, in the hope of securing a bumper vote harvest.
However, given that a Kenyan tradition has over time crystallized that the country’s West bloc of Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western or the East bloc of Mt Kenya, Eastern, Coast and North Eastern (Nairobi can fit into both) should not singly produce the president and vice president/deputy president, President Ruto’s choice of an assistant from Western Kenya could backfire. We shall wait to see whether his current Western Kenya pointsmen can deliver critical support or, given mounting political heat, they will scamper to opposition ranks so as to save their political skins.
The United Alternative Government (UAG) (formerly United Opposition) is also largely mobilizing its rank and file on ethnic basis principally around Mt. Kenya and South Eastern blocs. The potentially discriminatory moniker ‘cousins’ had been coined as a unifying springboard. UAG is also targeting ODM dominated Coast region. This formation under the charismatic leadership of Rigathi Gachagua and presidential hopeful Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka believes Nairobi county is one of its cosy bedrooms because of the populous Mt. Kenya and Kamba populations. And yet assuming one subscribes to ethnic ballot logic, the Luo and Luhya are equally dominant in the capital city.
Initially Kenyans had begun to embrace what was termed the People’s Opposition Alliance (POA) of Omtatah, Maraga, Mwangi, Kigame and Oloo. However, this group took time to coalesce as a progressive alternative. As the saying goes, nature abhors a vacuum. Linda Mwananchi has, within a short duration, endeared itself to Kenyans thereby inhabiting the space hitherto available for POA. The question remains whether POA will cohere and birth ideologically defined politics. Alternatively, POA could choose to work with Linda Mwananchi if ideological affinity develops between the two groups.
Linda Mwananchi is the new kid on the bloc. Even as the leadership mobilizes Kenyans of all walks, they also, as aforesaid, are focusing on reaping huge voter blocs such as Luo Nyanza and Western Kenya for a start. This new formation has endeavoured to create and maintain its distinctiveness as a political force while repeatedly popularizing the cause of opposition unity.
‘Mimi ni Sifuna’ (actually ‘Mimi ni Mkenya’) has continually advised that opposition unity is a sine qua non for terminating President Ruto’s statehouse tenancy. Again the questions pop up: how will opposition oneness happen, through who, when, and, most critically, embodying what ideology and agenda?
Another formation - the youth force tentatively solidifying itself under the NikoKadi Youth Movement and other youth struggle sites - is distrustful of legacy politicians. These Gen Z/Y generations, including a sizeable diaspora population (who are yet to be enfranchised) are preparing to plunge into elective politics. They espouse progressive politics of a social democratic lineage, at a minimum. You can only ignore them at your peril. I can bet they are likely to upset the apple cart in 2027. They still remain ‘tribeless’, but not ‘leaderless’ any more. They have developed the National Youth Manifesto and the Kenya People’s Manifesto. The youth are challenging Kenyan politicians and Gen-Zote to re-imagine Kenya. Why are we stuck where we are, 63 years into independence? How can we recover the lost decades?
Let me again pose the question: Is it a good idea for United Alternative Government, Linda Mwananchi, People’s Opposition Alliance and the GenZ/Y NikoKadi formations to unite as happened, through patriotic initiatives, in the 2002 push for KANU’s defeat?
Those genuinely committed to rebuilding Kenya must urgently engage her citizens from ward level so that citizens can credibly participate in the formulation of The Kenya We All Want. A Transformative Agenda for Kenya (TAKE) (2027-2032) will be the inception of rescuing Kenya from its current socio-economic, cultural and political malaise. Pipedream promises will not do. Neither will politics as usual bring relief. Opposition unity alone, even when it is soothing music, is not the panacea for Kenya’s transformation.
The opposition has severally admitted the president is not a push over, but a formidable adversary even as they heap on him all manner of nicknames including inveterate liar. In 2022, he was able to defeat the sitting president’s candidate. At 26 and 31 in 1992 and 1997, he delivered, with others of course, two elections for President Daniel Arap Moi. In 2005 he was a key protagonist of the NO Orange referendum campaign. As an initial supporter of Raila Odinga’s political ambition and rise, he was at the centre of ODM’s founding. He significantly helped Uhuru Kenyatta navigate their International Criminal Court (ICC) quagmire and proceeded to lend a decisive hand in Uhuru’s 2013 and 2017elections. Therefore to underestimate Ruto, is to court disaster.
I am not suggesting the opposition cannot dispatch the president to retirement. But, trust me, there will be a battle royale. The opposition must not believe that large crowds in public meetings will translate into an automatic 2027 win. True, the current polls credit the opposition with substantial citizen support. Cartop campaigning without well-choreographed strategy will not give the opposition an edge. Decisive opposition victory will be delivered if they beat the incumbent with a massive landslide.
The president commands the following diverse war chest: the security apparatus especially the National Police Service; the national administrative structures up to the village level (village elders are slated to get a government stipend); overall national public service especially at senior level; a captured Parliament; Rasputin - like influence over segments of the judiciary and county governors; some leverage over IEBC and the national registration bureau; massive personal resources; free access to national budget; international community approval (because he dutifully does whatever they ask) and so on. Ruto is adept at honing his strengths and exploiting the weaknesses of his nemeses.
Let us remember the majority of Kenyans, especially at the lower echelons of our society, even youth, are susceptible to the lure of handouts. Errant politicians are able to buy the vote or identity card or a supply of goon violence.
Strategically UDA will try to rent or create friendly political parties which will infiltrate areas perceived as antagonistic to the ruling regime. Even a loss for these shadow candidates will be a win for the president if they enhance his presidential vote.
The United Alternative Government, Linda Mwananchi and People’s Opposition Alliance should, for now, continue to campaign separately. So should the youth formations. All should deploy Shaka Zulu’s Impondo Zonkamo or ‘the buffalo horns’ or pincer movement tactical manoveur through which enemy was subjected to coordinated attacks from ultimately converging multiple flanks.
The Ministry of Youth Affairs, Sports and the Arts has promised to host this July the National Youth Council (NYC) elections from ward to national levels. Kenya’s youth must grab the opportunity to elect their authentic representatives, not political class proxies. The youth deserve an independent voice. True government may believe that an official NYC will stymie youth street action or deliver government friendly youth delegates. It is up to the youth to counter such potential subterfuge so as to ensure a post 2027 government delivers a National Youth Marshall Plan.
If the government manages to tactfully divide or buy some opposition figures, then the incumbent will most probably bag the trophy. In 1992 and 1997, Moi successively won the presidency with respectively 36.8 and 40.4 percent of the vote. The divided opposition was left licking their wounds. The country lost a decade.
Significantly whoever captures a parliamentary majority post the 2027 elections can even become a de facto president. Senegal has taught us such informal power should be exercised responsibly. Raila Odinga had perfected such a game.
As has happened in the past, the 2027 presidential election winner may post a small margin. Hence a pre and post-election coalition may be an option. No single political party is likely to be hegemonic.
In conclusion, Kenyans do not expect the elections to reproduce the violence witnessed in 2007/2008. The political class must ensure that the morning after the general election, people can go back to their jobs and other places of work.
Finally, it is our responsibility as Kenyans to propel our political culture from ethnic to issue based politics which focus on our collectively defined national interest. We must turn the corner.