The Narc betrayal has been considered by many Kenyans and political pundits as the modern era mother of political backstabbing and remains a point of reference anytime these deceits are discussed.
Political analysts argue that the Mwai Kibaki-Raila Odinga National Rainbow Coalition (Narc) was bound to fail in its infancy because it was not based on a solid ideological foundation.
Analysts and commentators state that the alliance was a mere special-purpose vehicle hurriedly assembled by opposition leaders of diverse political orientations to wrestle power from Kanu in the 2002 elections.
The fragmented opposition had suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Kanu in 1992 and 1997, and it was thus eager to craft a winning strategy and avoid the pitfalls of the past elections.
Political strategist, Julius Kariuki, who coordinated Kibaki’s re-election campaign in the Rift Valley region, said the Kibaki-Raila alliance was a marriage of convenience structured on sinking sand.
“Former President Kibaki and Raila had distinct political philosophies that made it difficult for them to read from the same script from the word go,” Dr Kariuki stated.
He added that each of the two leaders also had the backing of a cabal of leaders who were driven by a raw lust for power and a desire for the accumulation of wealth, which triggered conflicts amongst the coalition partners.
Another analyst, Andrew Nyabuto, said Kibaki and Raila operated in a complex political environment.
“The two leaders were unable to contain their loyalists who perceived State power as an opportunity for personal aggrandizement and opportunity to recoup what they had invested in the campaigns and prepare themselves for the next General Election,” Nyabuto observed.
Nyabuto said the increasing incidents of political betrayals among leaders forming coalition governments in Kenya were the result of “selfishness, ethnic bigotry, chauvinism, and desire on the part of those wielding state power to accumulate more wealth.”
He added that political alliances and coalitions were also driven by political opportunism, “with many leaders having no concrete agenda for the country but desire to plunder its resources.”
The political analyst added that the “majority of political leaders lacked commitment to ideals and values that form the basis of genuine political engagements and which form the foundation of positive socio-economic and political transformation.”
Kariuki and Nyabuto added that the tendency of leading presidential contenders to solicit the support of their ethnic communities had compounded the culture of political betrayals as any person ascending to the presidency was held captive by his tribesmen.
The duo added that politics in Kenya is driven and fuelled by teams of business cartels only interested in making money when their preferred candidates assumed office as president.
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“The competition for the presidency in Kenya has been reduced to competition between the top five ethnic groups, namely the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luos, Kalenjin and Kambas, who form alliances amongst themselves. The other small communities are bystanders,” Nyabuto said.
Nyabuto said Kibaki had the support of his Kikuyu community with the support of the Luhya and Kamba communities.
At the same time, Raila rallied his Luo community, the Maasai, a section of Luhya and coastal communities.
“Political differences must arise amongst coalition partners as the president strives to appease those who financially backed his presidency and his collation partners who brought the votes,” Kariuki stated.
Kibaki, with the support of other opposition leaders, rode to power on an ecstatic wave of change that ended close to 40 years of Kanu’s firm grip on the country’s leadership.
The president’s National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) party had teamed up with Raila’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to form the National Rainbow Coalition (Narc).
Kibaki’s ascendance to power in the December 2002 General Election heralded a new dawn for the country, as a fragmented opposition had failed to capture power in the 1992 and 1997 general elections.
From the onset, the overriding factor leading to the formation of the Narc coalition was the opposition’s burning desire to vanquish Kanu from power.
Raila dissolved his National Development Party (NDP) shortly after the 1997 polls, which he had contested as a presidential candidate and lost, and entered into a merger with Kanu, headed by former President Daniel Moi.
However, President Moi, who had crafted his succession plan, endorsed Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor, replacing Raila and several other leading figures in Kanu who left the party to chart their political destiny.
Raila left Kanu together with disgruntled former Cabinet ministers Professor George Saitoti, Kalonzo Musyoka, Joseph Kamotho, William Ntimama and Joe Nyaga, among others.
Strange twist
On his part, the Kibaki team included Michael Wamalwa Kijana and Charity Kaluki Ngilu.
But in a strange twist of fate, the Narc ship soon sailed into turbulent waters after ascending to power as partners squabbled over an unfilled pre-election power-sharing pact.
The fallout between the two leaders, who had been a beacon of hope for the country, undermined the country’s political stability following the outbreak of the 2007 post-election violence.
Tales of betrayal, backstabbing, and broken promises became the bane of Kibaki’s relationship with Raila, whom he had appointed as Roads minister.
Soon after the elections, Kibaki visited the Central Kenya region and his Nyeri backyard in the company of Raila, who received a standing ovation and ululations from jubilant residents for his role in ensuring Kibaki’s election.
The Central Kenya residents described Raila as “Mutongia Njamba” (brave leader), but the tide changed against him as his conflict with President Kibaki escalated.
The bitter fallout between the two leaders, who had rallied the country together and delivered a resounding defeat of Kanu, culminated in the 2007 post-election violence, which drove the country to the edge of a precipice.
In a dramatic move that shook the country’s political landscape, Raila declared ‘Kibaki Tosha’ at a packed opposition rally at Uhuru Park, redefining the country’s political architecture.
Raila’s declaration was made just a few hours after he had signed a coalition agreement with Simeon Nyachae, a former finance minister who had pledged to support his presidential bid.
The “Kibaki Tosha” declaration was both a blessing and a curse for Raila.
He became a darling of the Kibaki-led wing of the opposition while the Nyachae allies and supporters vilified and branded him a traitor.
The LDP wing of the coalition accused the president of reneging on implementing the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that they had signed before the elections.
The coalition agreement embodied the MoU, which was meant to provide the blueprint for governance and power-sharing for the Narc administration. This ignited vicious and acrimonious exchanges between the leaders of the two parties.
The dispute centred on the Kibaki administration’s failure to establish the prime ministerial position that had been earmarked for Raila.
The LDP wing further accused the Kibaki of failing to adhere to the 50-50 basis arrangement on the appointments to the cabinet. The president’s coalition wing was said to have received disproportionate cabinet slots.
The Raila faction accused the Kibaki administration of reneging on Narc’s election pledge to the electorate that a new constitution would be in place within the first 100 days.
Kibaki’s rejection of a parliamentary system of governance led to his fallout with Raila and stalled the push for reforms that had propelled their collation to power.
Prime Minister
Raila favoured a parliamentary system of government with a Prime Minister voted by MPS, executive powers to run the government, and a ceremonial president as head of state.
Kibaki and his team favoured an Executive President with the authority to hire and fire the Prime Minister.
When the government finally subjected the draft constitution to a national referendum, Raila led a team of his allies, including influential regional leaders, including Uhuru Kenyatta, in rejecting the document.
The draft, which was subject to a referendum in 2005, saw the “No” side win with 58 percent of the votes.
Kibaki hit-back by dismissing the entire cabinet and reconstituting a new team as hostility mounted.
The polarisation, divisions and tensions that emerged from the failure of the Kibaki administration to fully implement the terms of the MoU, coupled with the bitter campaign against the draft constitutions.
This continued until the 2007 general elections and that snowballed into violence that engulfed many parts of Nyanza, Western, Nairobi and Rift Valley province leading to deaths of 1,200 people and destruction of property worth millions of shillings.
The pro-Raila camp had galvanised itself as a political party under the Orange Democratic Party banner against pro-Kibaki forces, which had supported the rejected draft.
Kibaki dissolved the cabinet soon after the 2005 referendum and reconstituted a new one, leaving out Raila and his allies, who embarked on spirited nationwide campaign tours in preparation for the 2007 elections.
Kibaki, who edged out the LDP wing of the Narc coalition from power, sought support from the KANU and Ford-People political parties to stabilize his government.
The 2007 elections pitted Raila and his team against Kibaki who was defending his seat.
Violence broke out after the Raila camp denounced the process of counting, collating and transmission of votes which they said had been tampered with to provide a win for Kibaki.
Kibaki was nevertheless declared the winner after garnering close to 4.5 million votes defeating with Raila with a margin of close to 200,000 votes.
Both Kibaki and Raila entered into another phase of coalition in what was regarded as a Grand Coalition Government following an African Union sponsored power sharing deal that brokered a peace truce.
The mediation which was facilitated by a former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former Tanzania President Jakaya Kikwete resulted in the signing of National Accord and Reconciliation Act that entrenched a power sharing deal between President Kibaki and Raila who became the Prime Minister.
The accord also facilitated the appointment of equal number of leaders from the opposing sides to the cabinet.
The national accord further ended up creating two centres of power between the President and Prime Minister.
Raila also accused the Kibaki of failing to consult him while making key government appointments of enacting policies.
National Assembly
The frost relationship between the President and the Prime Minister continued occasionally threatening operations at the National Assembly where key government bills were derailed by Raila’s wing of the government.
Both Kibaki and Raila rallied their support bases in a historic event that saw the adoption of the new Constitution in August, 2010.
During the 2013 elections, the Kibaki team endorsed Uhuru Kenyatta as its favoured presidential candidate as Raila threw his hat into the ring.
Kariuki argued that failure by the government to enact laws that provide for sound management of coalitions governments had made it possible for parties to pre-election agreements to renege on their part of their bargain.
“I think it is high time for Parliament consider coming up with sound rules to manage coalitions and provide clear road maps for sharing of power and appointments amongst coalition partners to reduces incidents of political betrayals,”Kariuki added.
Nyabuto added that corruption and other scandals were rampant in different wings of coalition governments in Kenya as leaders compete to amass wealth and war chest for the general election ahead.
He observed that failure by the country to nurture and develop viable political parties had also contributed to the culture of political betrayals as “politics is more centred around personalities making the pact than on party structures.”