Reforms, 2027 and end of 'nusu mkate' circus

Power deals have come in all shapes and forms in Kenya — cooperation, nusu mkate, handshake, and ‘broad-based’ government. Scholars say such deals can only be inclusive, dispersive or constraining. Few can tell which of the three defines Kenya’s ‘quicksand’ pacts.

While coalition arrangements offer some stopgaps, they’ve exposed the fragility of democracy, and there are many living examples. Unable to fix electoral and legitimacy issues, Israel and Germany have almost permanently turned to unity deals to get numbers and pacify dissenters.

In 2021, Germany’s SPD, FDP, and Greens, led by Olaf Scholz, became the first to form a three-party coalition at the federal level.

In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu leads a coalition of six parties — Likud, United Torah Judaism, Shas, Religious Zionist Party, Otzma Yehudit and Noam.

Recently, 10 South African parties united following a dismal showing by the African National Congress in the May 29 polls. Mr Cyril Ramaphosa sought a broader consensus to help him navigate many complexities. In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement established a power-sharing that ended conflict between Unionists and Nationalists. In Switzerland, the concept of ‘consociationalism’ has allowed for power-sharing among different and extreme linguistic and religious groups, contributing to the country’s long-standing political stability.

In Lebanon, the system has maintained a delicate balance of power among its religious communities through a deal that allocates key positions to different sects.

However, since Kenya’s new Cabinet was unveiled, jitters persisted, at least according to public sentiments. Many Kenyans, such as Siaya Governor James Orengo, see the unity government as a circus and crutch rather than a cure. The result? Coalitions will be a ‘hard sell’ going forward.

I dare say the Ruto-Raila deal will be the last of its kind. By 2027, a more informed citizenry will insist that the government and opposition stick to their lanes. They won’t tolerate the blurring of lines, and Wanjiku will want public participation before decisions prejudicing her choices are made.

You won’t believe it. Any ‘quicksand’ power deal flouted in 2027 will be dead on arrival. Another reality is that the new union and absence of Raila in the local political arena — assuming he secures the coveted African Union chairmanship — will make President Ruto’s quest for a second term easier. Without Raila as a formidable opponent, Ruto won’t need to craft another makeshift alliance to survive. The president’s estimable mobilisation skills will prove handy.

Meanwhile, it is wishful thinking to imagine that Ruto and Raila will part ways. Their interests will converge more and more. With no probable coalition after 2027, it means 2032 and beyond will not be any different. It will be long before power-sharing returns to the land.

And, with no need for ‘moral’ support of a weak opposition led by Kalonzo Musyoka, Ruto will win and the govern on his own terms. Even former ‘truthful’ allies and ‘shareholders’ who may part ways with the president ahead of 2027 won’t change this equation.

Amid the Gen-Z willpower, the future will depend less on power-sharing and more on the strength and credibility of Kenya’s electoral processes. This is why we must return to the touchy debate of electoral reforms. We need sweeping reforms.