How can we cure the curse of Kenya's second-in-command?

Why have there been so few impeachments of Vice Presidents one may wonder. My view is America’s constitutional architecture, unlike ours, is aligned with their political culture. Our misalignment makes it difficult to manage these constitutionally imposed relationships, most exemplified by the incessant battles between governors and deputies in counties.

The reason why deputies stay in office in democracies like America is that while these deputies know they occupy a constitutionally significant office, they operate within a culture that recognises the nature of presidential power, it abhors multiheadedness. Even where, like our deputies, they will have “brought votes”, they know once the election is won, there is only one winner; the win is not shared.

I do not hail this as a necessarily progressive culture, but it seems to be the principal reason why these officials are never the subjects of removal. They know their place. That said, it is important to note that because of its constitutional significance, that office has been the cause of grief for many American Vice Presidents.

Indeed, the first Presidential impeachment in 1868 was of Andrew Johnson who succeeded Lincoln after the latter’s assassination. The impeachment was pushed by the Lincolnites who had never liked Johnson and his Southern-leaning policies. Johnson was acquitted by the Senate but could not even marshal enough votes to be a Democratic Party candidate in 1868.

In a similar manner, after the death of President J F Kennedy in 1963, Vice President Lyndon Johnson was so fearful of the Kennedy crowd that he insisted on being sworn in on Airforce One at the airport in Texas, suspicious that Robert Kennedy, then serving as Attorney General, and others, would stop him from ascending to the Presidency. I give these stories to confirm that there is nothing unique in the challenges Kenya’s Deputy Presidents undergo. What we don’t appear to have deciphered is how to effectively manage the delicate dichotomy of a constitutionally powerful office but a politically weak one.

Constitutionally the office is powerful because one cannot be removed from office at the whim of the President. The procedural steps for removal are so convoluted that they can protect a Deputy who invests just a little more than DP Gachagua did in creating political alliances, 13 votes in the Senate, all things considered, is an embarrassment.

The office is however politically weak because in Kenya, power gravitates to the top. A Deputy’s political power is totally dependent on the President. A wise Deputy knows not to be suspected of creating alternative power centres that may appear intended to challenge the boss.

Woe unto the one who seeks to build powerbases too early and when they are politically vulnerable. They will be mauled. Did we make a mistake in having a constitutionally powerful but politically weak Deputy? Should we have allowed our Presidents to fire their Deputies when they were no longer fit for purpose?

While there can appear to be merit in this option, it goes against the spirit of our Constitution which was running away from dominant individuals to institutionalising offices. This we must continue to do. But if this arrangement is to succeed, we must supplement the Constitution with a political culture where maturity, respect, honour and tolerance are dominant features.

That said, for all its faults, and this process had many faults, I remain proud of our Constitution.  

The writer is an advocate