Unusual reflection of Ruto's mid-term promises against actions on delivery

In the face of unnecessary disruptions and unfortunate thuggery escorting President William Ruto’s recent promise-laden “development tour” of Nairobi, most Kenyans will have missed the concurrent launch of a detailed mid-term performance scorecard of his achievements since he assumed office in September 2022.

Released by the unit responsible for performance and delivery in the Executive Office of the President, the scorecard loudly proclaims: “we are on track”.

“We” means the Ruto Administration, in the US-style of naming; yet it reminds us that the regime once known as the Kenya Kwanza Administration is now an amorphous, broad-based government. 

Remember a mid-first term moment two decades ago, when the Narc administration became an equally nebulous Government of National Unity so we named it the Kibaki Administration? Yes, the circumstances were different, but our political chessboard hasn’t changed!

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We know what followed in the lead up to the 2007 election and its deadly aftermath, but let’s leave it to our political scientists, seers and soothsayers to tell us if 2027 will rhyme with, if not repeat, that history.

Turning back to Ruto’s performance scorecard, what do we observe?  Here are five quick reflections.

First, and most interesting, is the seeming political silence on this scorecard.  While President Ruto himself tends to offer a mix of achievement and promise in his engagements with the public, it is surprising that many in the rest of his team (Cabinet and Principal Secretaries) and party (Members of Parliament) are not yet up to speed with the scorecard, and it has been left to technocrats to sell the message of progress.  This isn’t about whether or not there has been progress, but inviting an open public debate on if it is real.

Second, the scorecard contains a usefully detailed list of work that has been done or is ongoing across the five pillars of the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda (Beta) and all government ministries.  It is an update on earlier ones shared with the public, but one can still see demonstrable improvements in agriculture, from production outputs to specific initiatives. 

Of all of the pillars, this is the only one that looks to be on track to exceed expectations.   This is not to say that there hasn’t been any progress in the other pillars — micro, small and medium enterprises, affordable housing, universal health care and digital/creative. 

The trouble here is the recorded achievements are mostly input and activity-based, so it is no surprise that Kenyans at large are still not feeling the outputs (as service delivery) or outcomes (for households). 

A third reflection — relating to the lack of wider political and public engagement above — is that the scorecard is an overly technocratic presentation. 

As one Kenyan commented on TV, the data comes across as “too much board-presentation powerpoint, not enough “results kwa ground for real people”.  

The problem here speaks to a lack of bureaucratic imagination, the inability to translate data into real stories. 

This problem isn’t unique to this administration; it is a long-standing one that draws its history from government as a secret; or serikali as “siri-kali”. 

Thought about in reverse, this lack of transparency in data presentation — where transparency is not just about open access but relatability and ease of understanding — is probably why politicians give such communications a wide berth, preferring populism. 

In truth, none of these three reflections is incurable. 

As pure messaging, it is a simple task to translate technocratic data into political (and policy) cues for better public engagement.  

At the moment, however, this scorecard reminds us of those from the previous Jubilee administration that were publicly ridiculed.

The real point from these first reflections is this: make it simple, not simplistic.  Kenyans aren’t dumb. 

The other point, for my final reflections, is the opposite: while this is complex, it need not be complicated. 

Beginning with a fourth reflection on complicated government.  As Jubilee found, this scorecard will be contrasted against existing credible ones. 

First, the National Treasury’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework /Budget documents (including Quarterly Economic and Budget Reviews and other fiscal reports) which provide financial and non-financial performance data.  Second, the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate’s annual progress reports on Beta/Fourth Medium-Term Plan (MTP IV).

Third, the Controller of Budget’s quarterly and annual financial and non-financial reporting. 

Fourth, the Auditor-General’s annual compliance, financial statement and value for money/performance audit reports. 

Fifth, the Quarterly Economic Reviews and the Annual Economic Survey issued by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.  Sixth, the Monthly and Quarterly Economic Reviews prepared by the Central Bank of Kenya.  Before the implementation of the Ministerial performance contract reporting, or internal performance and delivery reporting in counties which has zero visibility nationally.  This is not a problem of the scorecard, it is our long unresolved failure, or reluctance, to harmonize, align and coordinate reporting across the complexity of government without being complicated. 

If there is one disappointment with this and the previous Jubilee administration it has been this inability, or unwillingness, to imagine and create a single reporting framework with multiple uses across varied audiences. 

This brings us to a fifth and final reflection.  The scorecard bravely attempts to capture promises made in the Kenya Kwanza manifesto as Beta promises before, as stated earlier, logging mostly input and activity-level achievements (excluding agriculture) against these promises. Yet this is to miss two things.

  First, Beta as a simple yet complex “policy model” built around nine end-to-end value chains, five vertical pillars, four horizontal platforms, multiple enablers and five investment/economic clusters all designed to deliver six outcomes for Kenyans.   That’s where implementation and reporting lies technocratically and popularly.  Remember, “what gets measured, gets done”.  Do the measures before measuring the doing. 

As said before, Beta is a long-term enterprise – outputs (service delivery) in three years, outcomes (household level) in five to seven years, impacts (community, regional, national level) in 10 to 15 years. 

This is the background thinking that should have guided this scorecard, especially if this administration had earlier pushed Beta as a long-term Sessional Paper, not panel-beaten it into MTP IV of Vision 2030.  Indeed, as a colleague suggested, one day we might find Beta successfully implemented outside Kenya! 

Second, Beta as the guide to a new “public institutional model”.  The fact of the matter is that Kenya’s present public service ethos is simply not aligned with the Beta policy model, and this feeds into my first four reflections on this scorecard: the need to be simple but complex, not simplistic or complicated.   

A new institutional model would harmonise and align our overly complicated implementation and reporting.

So, where is President Ruto on his Beta Scorecard?  After two and half years, he is probably one to -one and a half years behind target (remember Beta as MTP IV was launched after one and a half years in office). 

His acid test for the next two and a half years is whether a broad-based government helps deliver the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda for better services and household well-being.