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Few politicians, among them Raila Amolo Odinga, have the drive to win despite losing. He is endowed with an acute sense of political timing that somehow runs short of capturing the prize. He constantly schemes to destabilise the State to get what he wants, power, and gains enough political leverage to dictate terms to official winners. He forces winners to believe that conceding to him is peacemaking, often at the expense of potential challengers to his ascendancy to power. Four election related events in 1997, 2007, 2017, and 2022, spanning three decades illustrate his effectiveness in creating environments for political deal making.
First was the deal with President Daniel arap Moi that soured in 2002. As violence was meted out to Democratic Party leader Mwai Kibaki's supposed supporters following the 1997 election, Raila dumped opposition politics and ganged up with Moi. His aim was to gain power and or inherit the Kanu political organisation when Moi's final constitutional term ended. He worked closely with William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta in Kanu, but when Moi disappointed him by anointing Uhuru, Raila jumped to Kibaki's winning camp in a 2002 election temporary NARC political alliance. His impatience for political power, assisted by the conceptual West, ended up disrupting Kibaki's government.
The 'donors' assisted disruptions in NARC directly led to the 2007 violence that made Raila prime minister. It had built up during the Yash Pal Ghai constitution making at Bomas of Kenya between 2003 and 2005 which gave rise to the 2005 Orange and Banana referendum. Ghai, Raila, and 'donors' made it appear as if the referendum was about removing Kibaki from office rather than Kenyans accepting or rejecting a document.
Although the Orange side won, Kibaki stayed put and reminded people that there was no vacuum. Thereafter Raila, Ruto, and Kalonzo Musyoka created the Orange Democratic Movement to face Kibaki in the 2007 presidential election. In addition, Kibaki annoyed Raila and the 'donors' by narrowly winning the 2007 election, after which they created climate of ungovernability. This enabled the 'donors' to impose 'power sharing' or 'nusu mkate' that gave Raila power as PM and was almost equal to the president. Raila's path to the presidency appeared cleared since Kibaki's two terms were ending in 2012, a new friendly 2010 Constitution was in place, and two of his potential challengers, Uhuru and Ruto were answering questions at The Hague. The voters, however, rejected Raila and the Western demands and elected Uhuru and Ruto.
The 'donors' then retreated from overt involvement in Kenyan politics but Raila restrategised to force accommodation after elections. He accused Issack Hassan-led IEBC commissioners of eating chicken and had them replaced with the Wafula Chebukati team as a way of preparing for 2017. He again lost, turned to making the country ungovernable and convinced Uhuru that 'peace' would come through 'handshake' seemingly at the expense of DP Ruto. With Uhuru's support and the 'deep state' on his side, Raila believed 2022 was his only for the voters to disappoint him by narrowly choosing Ruto. The reasons given as to why he lost, besides blaming Chebukati's supposed weaknesses, varied from failure to pay or have agents, complacency and low voter turnout in critical zones and belief that the state would do 'something'. Raila then made the country ungovernable through what a stone carrying three-year-old-boy called 'Maamano'. He seems to have forced Ruto to cut political deal.
Raila wins despite losing by creating havoc and making post-election power deals. Other players are jittery and engage in political sideshows to appear relevant. They lose because what counts is the deal to advance the Ruto/Raila perceived interests. Likely losers include DP Rigathi Gachagua, among others on the Ruto side. Kalonzo and Jeremiah Kioni lead the likely losers on Raila's side. Political deal cutting Raila wins.