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President William Ruto is a bright, hardworking man with his hands in many policy pots. At times, his policies contradict ether because of the changing revolutionary dynamics in world affairs that are linked to political economy. This makes it difficult for him to balance political desires with economic realities and it occasionally lands him in trouble. This commentary seeks to appraise Kenya’s Foreign Policy outlook under the Kenya Kwanza government.
He has been in office for roughly two years and has, more than other leaders in or out of Africa attracted a lot of attention. He likes attention, especially the international one and does his best to remain in good books with the West while maintaining ‘strategic ambiguity’; he initially seemed to succeed.
He was, for instance, so well received in the West as the likely leader of the African continent that he took on talking for the collective Africa to the rest of the world. He travelled the world widely, averaging three foreign trips per month, as the domestic scene continued to deteriorate. He also appeared to be hostage to such forces as the IMF, the World Bank, and what he called ‘friends’. In June 2024, the travels virtually came to a temporary two-month halt due to Gen Z demonstrations. This damaged his ‘international reputation’.
Troubling signs of Kenya’s foreign policy were clear on the inauguration day. First, Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua made a misstep by disproportionately attacking former President Uhuru Kenyatta prompting the visiting African heads of state and government to comment that they had not come to Kenya for domestic infighting.
Additionally, following a visit from the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ruto’s decision to expel the Sahrawi envoy contradicted the AU’s position on Western Sahara. This knee-jerk reaction backfired when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that Kenya did not conduct foreign policy via Twitter, forcing Ruto to retreat on the expulsion.
Despite these initial diplomatic blunders, Ruto exhibited a determination to make a mark on global issues, perhaps to outshine Uhuru. He outperformed his predecessor in global travels and struck the right chord in the Global South. His ‘strategic ambiguity’ allowed him to navigate geopolitical disputes while promoting peace. He began touring the region to outline his agenda and voiced his discontent with extra-continental powers summoning African leaders for ‘summits,’ vowing not to attend such gatherings while also calling for ‘de-dollarisation’ in world trade.
However, questions arose about his understanding of global political dynamics and the consistency of his positions. Despite his vow to shun ‘summits’ called by extra-continental powers, he often found reasons to attend, most recently in Beijing last month.
While getting out of touch with geopolitical developments in the Global South, Ruto seemingly got into US President Joe Biden’s geopolitical web in which Biden was searching for an agreeable African leader. Ruto’s seeming wish to be in the good books of the West, therefore, made him attractive especially as he finalized discussions about Kenya sending police officers to Haiti amidst stiff reservations.
Although the Kenyan courts found the exercise improper, he still went ahead with it on the strength of a ‘bilateral agreement’ between Kenya and Haiti. He was rewarded with invitations to attend meetings in Rome and Geneva, probably as the African leader, essentially to endorse Western positions on Ukraine; he did not disappoint.
He also received the Biden praises, was given a US state visit, and had Kenya designated as a US ‘Non-NATO Ally’ to strengthen US defence presence in Kenya and the Eastern Africa region. It was the high point of Ruto’s global presence.
Amid all that diplomatic accolades, however, were domestic troubles that spoiled Ruto’s image as a leader in the Global South. When Kenyans complained about extravagant foreign trips, especially the US state visit, he explained that his foreign ‘friends’ had paid for his luxury jet. While in the US, he defended high taxation as necessary, amidst growing resistance.
He insisted on the Parliament passing the Finance Bill 2024 with obnoxious provisions in it as some MPs used offensive language on critics. Since the collective attitude in the Ruto government offended common sense, therefore, the simmering public resentment expanded like a balloon that needed a prick to deflate it. The GenZ was the pin that pricked the Ruto balloon.
Kenya’s youth-led revolution of attitude reverberated globally and left pundits wondering who they were. They were very young children or about to be born in 2003 when Mwai Kibaki became president and ordered all children to go to school by saying “Watoto Wasome”, with no fees demanded. They received a good education, were exposed to critical readings, grew up in the digital explosion, and became critical thinkers.
They were baffled by the pain, docility, and diminishing sense of hope in their parents. With nothing to lose, and with evidence of malpractices, they decided to question government policies that made no sense.
They were fearless as they questioned extravagance by a few people squandering public resources, foreign control of public policy, high incompetence and corruption, and high taxes that created poverty instead of wealth production. Their strength was in stressing nonviolent demonstration, constitutionalism, the spirit of the national anthem, and serious public participation in law-making.
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In the process, Kenya was politically transformed and descended into an object of geopolitical curiosity in search of itself. No longer able to advise other African countries how they should behave, Ruto stopped foreign trips and even missed a key AU meeting in Accra where he was to report on reforms in Africa. Outside Kenya, the GenZs became inspirational to young people in other African countries who suffer similar insensitivity from their governments. Ruto was forced to rethink domestic and foreign policies in a transformed Kenya.
In response to this new domestic and international landscape, Ruto seems to have adopted political strategies aimed at winning back public favour.
His first move involved attempting to deflate the Gen Z momentum by appearing to make concessions, including withdrawing the Finance Bill 2024 and dismissing most cabinet secretaries while engaging in online discussions.
Second, he sought to infiltrate the youth movement that posed a visible threat to the political establishment, whether in government or opposition.
This led to a reported alliance among the political elite, resulting in the emergence of young goons masquerading as ‘demonstrators’ to discredit the Gen Z movement. This tactic aimed to paint the initial revolution of attitude as orchestrated anarchy, thereby diminishing public support.
Third, Ruto sought to reclaim the prominence he seemingly lost during the Gen Z upheaval, which he hoped would facilitate a rebuild of his international standing.
He believed he could restore political capital and foster stability by retaining most of the old cabinet while also incorporating some prominent figures from the Opposition, particularly ODM.
Although Ruto appears determined and seemingly has weathered the storm, he must rethink his strategies to effectively address external challenges that complicate his foreign policy.
Other African leaders, particularly those facing potential youth upheavals, should heed Ruto’s missteps. Divided into various ideological factions, they are unlikely to support Ruto’s ambitions as their spokesperson. The prospect of the West distancing itself from a domestically unstable Ruto serves as a caution against becoming overly cosy with Western enticements.
Given that Kenya does not rank among the top-tier Global South influencers, its domestic challenges further undermine its continental leadership potential. This reality complicates its bid to promote Raila Odinga as the AU Commission Chairman.
Ruto’s aspirations for recognition as the continent’s problem-solver and ‘peacemaker’ necessitate significant repackaging and enhancement.
Musalia Mudavadi, as Kenya’s foreign policy point person, must find renewed energy to alleviate domestic concerns that the nation’s sovereignty is compromised by foreign influences
The perception that ‘officials’ have effectively ‘sold’ crucial Kenyan institutions to foreign entities for personal gain has significantly contributed to the rise of the Gen Z movement.
The prevailing perception of corruption complicates efforts to persuade other nations that Kenya is prepared to engage honourably and without compromise. This impression is one that Ruto, Mudavadi, and Kenya must overcome to regain any semblance of standing in the international arena.
Prof Munene is an Associate Fellow at Mashariki Research and Policy Centre