How Uhuru Kenyatta’s strategists planned for election

Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto hold hands during 2013 election campaigns

By Mwaniki Munuhe  and Machua Koinange

Uhuru Kenyatta’s political strategists believed that they could not work with William Ruto in their quest for the presidency because he would not agree to play second fiddle, according to a leaked dossier seen by The Standard On Sunday.

The top secret document prepared just before the International Criminal Court (ICC) pre-trials began last September, and which formed the heart of Uhuru’s campaign strategy for the March 2013 General Election, believed the presidency would be won by a candidate from one of the big five communities — the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya or Akamba.

It also argued that Ruto, now Deputy President, would probably lose in a run-off with Uhuru. The document projected that in an election, Ruto would be placed ahead of Raila — whom they believed would finish third in the first round.

That scenario, the campaign strategists believed, would compel Ruto to come to the negotiating table and agree to be Uhuru’s running mate in the play-off.

Tipping point

The Uhuru team believed that the ICC would be the tipping point in the race for State House, and the momentum shifted after the countrywide prayer rallies that demonstrated that Uhuru and Ruto could work as team and win the presidency.

The document titled “State House 2012” provides interesting insights into how the Uhuru think tank viewed other candidates in the race, how they strongly believed that ethnic blocs would carry the day, and how they toyed with the idea of dangling carrots to the smaller communities to get them to back Uhuru.

It was prepared by what is described by impeccable sources as Uhuru’s “election war council,” a nerve centre made up of at least eight people. The team comprised politicians, businessmen, political strategists and lawyers and formed the heart of Uhuru’s presidential campaign.

The strategy included a comprehensive hypothetical election poll forecast done at least three months to the the elections, which compared Uhuru’s and Raila’s fortunes in every county.

The strategists believed that Raila would dominate the campaign trail with the issue of devolution, and hence developed a counter strategy. They also believed that Raila would use the ICC trials to discredit Uhuru, execute a populist agenda and rekindle the majimbo debate to win the elections.

The document states: “Raila Odinga: Revamp ODM and go directly to the people doing populist things, rekindle majimbo through the county debate.

Appointments and cash

Use the issue of ICC to discredit UK (Uhuru Kenyatta). He plans to dish out appointments and cash.”

In addition, the strategists believed Ruto would work to galvanize smaller communities.

They also mooted the idea of building a movement called “Pamoja” with countrywide public rallies that would work towards the goal of a G47 — bringing together all the counties to support Uhuru that would eventually morph into a movement like FORD, Rainbow and the Orange movement.

The think tank argued that Mr Eugene Wamalwa offered the most obvious choice for Deputy President, describing him as “non-threatening and inexperienced”.

According to the document, Uhuru would have offered former Mandera Central MP Abdikadir Mohamed the post of National Assembly Speaker, a position currently occupied by Mr Justin Muturi.

Mr Simeon Nyachae would have ended up as Senate Speaker if he had agreed to gun for it.

The document says: ”Speaker of the Senate seat…requires a more mature, seasoned person who can command respect and understands the underlying issues.”

The strategists believed that Raila’s would be his last stab at the presidency, underscoring the high stakes for him to win or go bust.

Says the document: ”Raila Odinga has a strong and cohesive voting bloc of 10 per cent in Nyanza. He has tremendous energy and is a shrewd political organiser. He is determined to attain the leadership of the country at any cost.”

It states that the winning formula was to join forces with Ruto and rope in Mr Kalonzo Musyoka, or Mr Wamalwa to get over the 50 per cent-plus-one vote threshold and avoid a run-off.

Ethnic blocs

One recurring theme in the strategy was that the March 2013 poll would be about cobbling together ethnic blocs, especially the big five.

Political strategist Mutahi Ngunyi described the strategy famously as the “tyranny of numbers” in January 2013.

It states: “Indeed, out of the three presidents and 10 vice-presidents, only one — (Joseph) Murumbi — was not from the big five and he only lasted six months (the assumption of course is that Saitoti was appointed as a Kikuyu).”

Of these communities, the dossier states, Central, Nyanza and Rift Valley have a track record for voting as a bloc almost to the man.

The narrative from the strategy states Uhuru had the best chance going into the election with virtually 37 per cent of the vote (from the Mount Kenya bloc) under lock-and-key, and needing only the support of either Kalonzo or Ruto to get over the top.

The strategists viewed the Kamba vote as not “cohesive enough as a bloc”, noting that Moi managed to chew away 34 per cent and Kibaki 17 per cent of the votes in 1997 and 2007 elections. Ironically in the last elections, the Akamba voted for CORD almost to the man.

Non-existent chance

Mr Musalia Mudavadi was viewed as having the support of only non-Bukusu voters in Western region, making up only 9 per cent of the voting bloc but with “an almost non-existent chance at the presidency and even with Uhuru as his running mate, the Mount Kenya region vote would not be reliable,” the document reveals. Mudavadi would not make the run-off unless he had the support of Raila Odinga, according to the document. Mr Wamalwa was seen as the emerging Bukusu leader capable of bringing to the table 5 per cent.

It states: “In the last elections, Bukusu voters gave Kibaki 32 per cent of the Luhya vote... Wamalwa has a lesser chance of winning than MM (Musalia Mudavadi)”.

The late Prof George Saitoti was described as a hybrid of the Kikuyu and Maasai voters, but had “failed to harness and obtain any of them as a voting bloc.”

The think tank began on the premise that they believed that of all the candidates, Uhuru was the only one virtually guaranteed of being in the run-off because of the Mount Kenya support. “Can we win? In the immortal words of Barack Obama, “Yes We Can!” the document states.

Uhuru campaign strategy was to select a candidate who could help him climb over the threshold and likely candidates oscillated between Kalonzo, Ruto, Mudavadi and Wamalwa. Raila was never an option.

“Statistically, the best option would be to join with Ruto…this would be an outright victory with no run-off,” according to the strategy that sought to rid the ticket of “unnecessary complications”.

A possible union with Ruto, however, was complicated by the situation on the ground after the post-election violence where Ruto was viewed in Central Kenya as a villain.

It states: “(Ruto) has emerged as foremost leader of the Kalenjin over Moi and what he has accomplished he would not be willing to roll back.

Even in the post-election scenario (2007), the Kalenjin may be too expensive to maintain. It appears, nonetheless, he is trying to galvanize the so-called smaller communities against the big communities”.

The think tank advanced that at best, Ruto could only end up as leader of the majority in the House and “in the event he goes for the presidency and fails, he can always negotiate at the stage of the run-off.”

Kalonzo is described as “dead set on being president” while Wamalwa is described as having the natural talent for the job (of Deputy President). He will bring nostalgia to the ticket (after his elder brother, Wamalwa Kijana, in 2002 Narc ticket with Kibaki that floored President Moi’s choice, Uhuru).”

The algorithm worked out by the strategists projected that with Wamalwa on the ticket, he would deliver 5 per cent vote, taking Uhuru’s tally to 42 with the Mount Kenya bloc but leaving Uhuru to scramble for 9 per cent to get over the top and for outright victory. All the potential match-ups were built on the premise that Uhuru must avoid a run off at all costs.

It continues: ”In this scenario, it would be important to galvanize the Kisii with potential 5 per cent, and try for a share of the 10 per cent of Ukambani and a share of 10 per cent of Coast and small communities.”

The carrot to be dangled to entice the smaller communities would include the positions of the Speaker for both Houses and majority leader.

Mr Simeon Nyachae is mentioned as a possible Senate candidate who could galvanize and deliver the 5 per cent Kisii vote in exchange for the Senate speaker’s position.

Active politics

Nyachae did not go into active politics because he had years earlier announced his retirement from politics.  According to the dossier, the majority leader seat would be left vacant “to be filled after the election. The seat should be the carrot dangled to other communities and women.”

The strategists were concerned about the growth of ODM as a movement after the 2005 referendum, and wanted to use the same platform to build a counter-movement along the same lines as Ford (Forum for the Restoration of Democracy) in 1991 and NARC-Rainbow in 2002. Both mass movements morphed into political parties.

“There is need to cobble up a political platform that can galvanize the mood of the people and that can be harnessed into a political movement that would sweep elections.”The advantage with a movement, the document argued, was that firstly the flagbearer would not be known until the election date was set and that everyone on the team would believe they have the best chance to win. 

”It was the movement that was to win the election, it did not matter who the candidate was.”