Defections to pro-establishment parties not a measure of voter thinking

NAIROBI: In the first weeks of 1993, as Kenyans were settling down to absorb the full importance of the first multiparty elections held in the final days of 1992, Bonchari MP Protus Momanyi defected from Mwai Kibaki’s Democratic Party to Kanu. It was a bombshell but worse was on the way. Momanyi had been a late comer to Opposition. He had been a Kanu die-hard who tried to get the party’s ticket but ran into the strong headwinds of Simeon Nyachae in Kisii forcing him to defect to DP. In the elections, Momanyi secured 6,034 votes on the DP ticket against his closest challenger Mark Bosire of Kanu who got 4,288 votes. In the by-election that followed in 1993, Momanyi secured 5,504 votes on a Kanu ticket against Ford-Kenya’s Richard Mbeche who polled 1,276 votes.

Kanu had obviously been forced mostly by the US to allow multi-partysm. It was never interested in multipartysm and never forgave its proponents. As soon as the 1992 elections were over, it came out strongly to reinstate what it believed in; single party rule in the name of unity and development, the same language Jubilee is speaking today. If the Opposition knew Kanu was going to fight back to kill competition, it certainly did not expect the fight to start immediately after 1992 elections. Dr Momanyi defected to Kanu before he was even sworn in as MP.
Then the trickle became a flood. After Momanyi in Kisii, Western Kenya came into play. Between August 1993 and August 1994, Ford Asili lost five Luhya MPs and several councillors in quick succession. Nicodemus Khaniri of Hamisi defected to Kanu in August 1993 followed by Apili Wawire of Lugari in November. Japheth Shamallah followed in Shinyalu, Benjamin Magwaga in Ikolomani and Javan Onami in Lurambi.

Defections spread even to Nyanza, where Charles Owino Likowa in Migori, Tom Obondo in Ndhiwa and Ochola Ogur in Nyatike, all from Ford Kenya, defected to Kanu. All the defections were from the Opposition to Kanu, not the other way round, an indication that Kanu, being the party in power, had carrots to dangle.
On March 16, 1993, The Guardian of UK, quoting some Opposition MPs, reported that Kanu was offering potential defectors up to £76,000 to join it. There were claims that to defect to Kanu, Wawire had been promised Sh20 million, was given Sh10 million before he defected and promised the balance after the by-election. The significance of the moves was that they exposed Kanu’s desperation and panic at its failure to secure popular support outside its strongholds, much as the ruling party claimed to be acting out of desire to unite the country.
In some cases, defectors claimed they were leaving Ford Asili because its leader, Kenneth Matiba, was dictatorial and had no time for the opinions of others. The defecting Luhya MPs claimed other leaders in Ford Asili were simply expected to follow Matiba’s bidding thereby implying that Kanu had more internal democracy and its leader Moi was more tolerant of divergent opinion.

In Nairobi, Kiruhi Kimondo defected from Ford Asili to Kanu in 1994. In 1996, Steve Mwangi also resigned as area MP, citing disappointment with the opposition. Weeks after his resignation, he hosted Moi in Gatundu at a function during which a local councillor also defected to Kanu. Soon, Ireri Ndwiga of Siakago defected from Kenya National Congress to Kanu, Agnes Ndetei abandoned DP for Kanu in Kibwezi, and Julius Njoroge defected to Kanu in Makuyu. Then, as now, the line peddled by defectors other than dictatorship was that the Opposition was pursuing a tribal motive, had no development agenda and was dividing the country.
What happened to Kanu in 1992 happened to PNU in 2007 and to Jubilee in 2013. The response, particularly by Jubilee, is strikingly the same as that of Kanu after 1992; buying defections, sponsoring rebellion and promising development to those who defect. Raiding Opposition support bases and buying Opposition MPs may be exciting. It may create a sense of achievement for the ruing party in between elections. It may cause panic in Opposition ranks, but it has hidden long-term advantages for the Opposition.
Such raids always help the targeted party to re-energise, strategise and focus. The recent defections and threats of defections in Western Kenya woke up ODM that was on “sleep” mode in the region. Defections re-energised the ODM bases in Kajiado Central and Malindi. Raids on and defection from Opposition provide good platforms to test public feelings about the ruling party and what has changed or remained the same since the elections. In Kajiado Central and Malindi, voters elected their MPs in the by-elections knowing well that those they were electing on CORD ticket were going to be in Opposition, not in government. That was the case when voters re-elected senators Moses Wetang’ula, Moses Kajwang and Mutula Kilonzo Jr in Bungoma, Homa Bay and Makueni respectively.

It may be that people no longer believe that development is the domain of the party in power. It may also mean that sometimes, people just want to make a statement that they want their voices heard and respected and they hate to be lectured on whom to elect. All these post-2013 Opposition victories can easily be seen as protests against the government and a show of confidence in Opposition leadership.

If what happened in 1997 after sustained anti-opposition campaign is anything to go by, defections and buying of MPs harden the Opposition for battles ahead, help them perfect their skills, work on past mistakes and develop the confidence that the party in power is beatable.

Defection of MPs to the ruling party is not a sign that the party in power is gaining momentum. It could be a sign that it is getting desperate and worried.