One of the symptoms of our continued elite-level political immaturity is the tendency to engage in clandestine politics. Instead of fully embracing open policy debate and competition within and between our political parties, our leaders prefer cloak-and-dagger habits. One example is the ongoing debate over President Uhuru Kenyatta’s political future. What does Kenyatta want? Will he retire come 2022? There have been rumors that the president might try to hang on as Prime Minister following a constitutional amendment. The president is on record saying he will retire. However, talk being cheap. A close examination of Kenyatta’s interest might shed some light on this matter.
As a former president with substantial financial interest, Kenyatta probably desires to have a successor that will let him retire in peace and protect his family’s vast economic interests. He may also want a successor that builds on some of his legacy projects, such as elements of the proposed Big Four Agenda. The last thing Kenyatta wants is to antagonise his likely successor, who may have scores to settle with him once he retires.
Despite the strong incentives to pick a successor, Kenyatta will not get to do so under circumstances of his own choosing. He faces important political constraints. Chief among these is the fact that, however flawed, Kenya’s raucous electoral democracy requires a popular presidential candidate. This reality means that whatever his sincere preferences are, Kenyatta must deal with Kenya’s two most popular politicians – Raila Odinga and William Ruto. The next question is, how do Messrs Odinga and Ruto map onto the likely characteristics Kenyatta wants in a successor? Between the two men, whose interests, once in power, would most be aligned with those of a retired President Kenyatta?
Consider Odinga. He is a self-made politician (albeit of dynastic pedigree), has a proven independent streak, and would certainly desire to stamp his own identity on the state and its policies. Given his own economic interests, he may be willing to accommodate Kenyatta, as a fellow dynast. However, Odinga’s political base and his own political instincts are structurally reformist, factors that would likely lead him to implement a non-trivial reorganisation of Kenya’s economy. Furthermore, the infusion of a new elite class loyal to Odinga into the state-business nexus would upset some of the relationships that have existed since the Kibaki era.
William Ruto, too, would be a mixed bag. On the one hand, he lacks the deep elite bench that Odinga has, and would therefore be structurally constrained by the people he would necessarily have to appoint into his government. In other words, he would face strong incentives to have a gradual transition out of the Kibaki-Kenyatta era. But on the other hand, as a “hustler he would face enormous pressure to remake Kenya’s political economy with a view of injecting new blood into the state-business nexus. Ruto also poses a different challenge: he is very popular in Central Kenya, and would therefore not need Kenyatta as a link to elites from the region.
All to say that in the post-Kenyatta period, while Odinga would likely need Kenyatta more than Ruto, the former would also be less constrained if he were to implement a radical departure from the Kenyatta years. This is Kenyatta’s dilemma. Hopefully, Kenyans will choose a brave future that is independent of Kenyatta’s interests.
- The writer is an Assistant Professor at Georgetown University
