Terrorists exploited well-known loopholes in Kenya

Kenya: The terrorists who struck Westgate Shopping Mall exploited well-known loopholes, most of which are yet to be sealed a year later.

Corruption, porous borders, impunity, laxity of security forces, a refugee problem, proliferation of small arms and difficulties in intelligence execution have been cited as some of the main loopholes that contributed to the Westgate disaster.

Exactly a year before the attack (September 21, 2012), an intelligence report had warned of an Al Shabab attack specifically on Westgate. Another brief in February 2013 had warned of an attack similar to those carried out in Mumbai in 2008, where operatives would storm a mall and hold hostages.

“There were claims of intelligence reports that suspected Al Shabaab operatives were in Nairobi and planning to mount suicide attacks on an undisclosed date, targeting Westgate Mall,” the joint parliamentary committee inquiry report into the attack affirmed.

Prior knowledge

The discovery of lapses between intelligence and implementation corroborates earlier findings by The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence. The inquiry led by Justice Philip Waki found that intelligence on the 2007/2008 post-poll clashes had been provided to all the necessary authorities, and was even well-documented.

“A question remains about the utility of some of the NSIS (National Security Intelligence Service) systems,” Waki concluded in 2008 after it emerged that there was a huge disconnect between intelligence gathering, specificity, sharing and implementation.

Most security bosses at the provincial, district and divisional levels were emphatic that they were not aware of the intelligence on the magnitude of the violence despite it having been developed and shared.

Gigiri police boss Vitalis Otieno was equally emphatic that he had no prior knowledge (read intelligence) of the Westgate attack, although he had conducted a security assessment at the mall when he was posted to the area.

The management of Nakumatt Supermarkets, the main tenant, and Althaus Services Ltd, the property managers, also told the parliamentary committee they were not aware of an imminent attack on the mall.

Through corruption and immigration loopholes, the four terrorists were able to leave Kakuma Refugee Camp and go to Eastleigh’s Third and Sixth streets in Nairobi where the plans to attack the mall were concluded.

By taking advantage of a haphazard phone SIM registration regime, the terrorists were able to secure communication to finalise and execute their barbarous plans.

Peter Aling’o of the Institute for Security Studies-Kenya warns that terrorists are aware of the loopholes in the country’s security system, and are keen to exploit them.

“They reckoned that even if the country had intelligence on their activities, we could not process that intelligence in time. And even if we processed it in time, we would not be in a position to reduce the intelligence into actionable terms,” Aling’o said.

He says corruption, poor anti-terror strategies, entrenched impunity and poor coordination of security agencies have emboldened terrorists to continue executing their evil plans on Kenyan soil.

“They know anything can pass in Kenya as long as you can pay for it. They know the bullish Johnny-come-lately and reactionary approach of Kenyan security forces will always bring up the wrong suspects. They know that even if they are arrested, the police will mess up the evidence,” Aling’o says.

The senior researcher believes that some of Kenya’s historical grudges have converged with Al Shabaab’s, making the situation even more volatile. Until the country agrees to undertake an honest reflection and to sort out its past, it will continue to face increased challenges, he says.

Andrew Franklin, a former US Marine commander and now a security expert in Kenya, says the biggest loophole terrorists exploited and will continue to exploit is the opportunism granted by the general administrative and bureaucratic confusion at all levels of the government.

He says the failure to learn from past attacks and put up structures to prevent similar attacks in the future has put Kenya at the mercy of terror groups. They are guaranteed of maximum returns with little effort.

“Look at the 1998 bombing of the US embassy, for instance. The Al Qaeda cell was able to set base from way back in 1993, acquire documentation, open companies, open bank accounts, plan their stuff in time and blow up the embassy.

“More recently, the Artur brothers checked into the country with all the right papers; complete with assistant commissioner of police ranks. They even had guns. What lessons did Kenya learn from these two events? I have seen nothing that indicates an interest to seal these well-known loopholes,” Franklin says.

According to the former Marine, many of the Kenyan systems that would enhance security lack the thoroughness and finesse necessary to guarantee returns. He cites security sector reforms and vetting of senior security staff as an example.

“I followed the vetting of police bosses; none of them was asked how they intended to implement the National Police Service Act. I also watched the presidential debate, and did not see any serious focus on the issue. The fact of the matter remains that this Act is yet to be implemented. And yet, in its implementation lies most of the solutions to the Westgate problem.”

Franklin believes lack of a proper command structure among the many police formations transforms the force into a “gang” when they converge on an operation such as the infamous Baragoi one. He says the entire world saw the confusion among Kenyan security forces in “real time” as Westgate unfolded.

The security expert is convinced of one thing; that one year after the Westgate attack, there has not been a noticeable resolve to make the country more secure. If anything, he says, Lamu has flared up, Mandera is burning, Marsabit is unstable, and Nairobi and other major towns remain vulnerable to terror raids.

He advises that immigration as well as registration of births, deaths, persons, companies, vehicles, refugees and so on need to be digitised and synchronised. It is inconceivable, he adds, that the Government is unable to know the directors of the companies that bought land in Lamu “in this day and age”.

Apart from the exit of Jane Waikenda and replacement by Maj Gen (rtd) Gordon Kihalangwa, a military man, little has changed at the Immigrations offices. A few senior officers were suspended last year and investigations into their conduct launched.

Corruption ratings

Besides these changes, there is no evidence of fresh ethos, either at Immigrations or in the general Kenyan population following the Westgate incident. Corruption ratings have not gone down in the past year.

The parliamentary report was categorical that there was poor coordination during the changeover of operations at Westgate from the police to the Kenya Defence Forces. The disorganisation cost some officers their lives, and the frosty relationship that ensued between KDF and police gave the terrorists more time to kill civilians and restrategise on how to extend the siege.

“If the General Service Unit was left to continue with the job, I am convinced they would have completed it by the evening of the first day. KDF was illegally deployed to Westgate; it was misused,” Franklin says.

The parliamentary report, which was rejected by the National Assembly earlier in the year, noted that despite numerous terror attacks in the country in the past, the security forces’ level of preparedness to deal with the situations had largely remained low. “The response mechanism of the security forces has been slow and lacking in coordination, to the extent that most of the damage is already done by the time the situation is contained,” the report stated.

The findings of the probe are corroborated by the recently released documentary, Terror at the Mall, where armed civilian rescuers testify about the confrontation between the police and military.