Jubilee won’t accomplish the nation’s development, democratic revolution

Can the Jubilee administration accomplish the national democratic and developmental revolution Kenyans have been yearning for since independence? Very unlikely. But why not? Because this revolution must begin with a profound agricultural transformation, the type that saw milk prices go from Sh6 to Sh17 per pint within the first six months of the Narc regime. Or putting millions of children into primary school without much ado as Narc did. Or relying entirely on domestic resources to finance the budget without necessarily increasing the rate of taxation (and without incurring debt to finance recurrent expenditure). We could begin to see that under Narc, growth was beginning to feed into development. I do not see such transformative policies under Jubilee.  And the following is why.

Were you to be involved in the exercise of analysing the speeches and the content of public discussions of Jubilee leaders since they came to power, you would be surprised if 90 per cent of what they talk about is not about politics of succession: it is. Cornered by questions and criticisms regarding his conduct as the Deputy President, William Ruto’s defence is in the following words: “Please do not spoil my chances of succeeding Uhuru.” Uhuru has been obsessed with keeping his flock together not to ensure his government delivers now—he takes that for granted—but that he is there after 2017 as President. If he does not begin the revolution now, why should he be there after 2017?

Granted: no President gets elected to be satisfied with one term, especially when the Constitution provides for a two-term mandate. But the whole idea here is that one should at least deliver tangible results and “be present” in the eyes of the people during the first term before a proposal is made to them to consider the renewal of the mandate. But it is rather arrogant to begin, from the word go, telling the people that you want a mandate renewed even before finishing half of that mandate. Do you want to be elected just because “you are who you are” or because you have a record of performance and delivery that warrants being re-elected?

Kenyans are not amused about this UhuRuto obsession with a second mandate, a third and fourth. It is this culture of authoritarian rule in which Ruto and Uhuru were nurtured which makes them so comfortable in expecting Kenyans to automatically renew their mandate even if they don’t perform. But why do they feel so confident in their project? I have possible answers.

First, Kenyans have always been manipulated by political entrepreneurs to swallow and live by the ideology of tribalism. This is not because Kenyans, as individuals, are innately tribalist, but because they are quite often given “closed choices”: either you “vote for our man or you ship out.” A few leaders have, however, overcome this “closed door” mentality from time to time. Our founding nationalists were, at the dawn of independence, true nationalists. Jomo Kenyatta, Ronald Ngala, Bildad Kaggia, Masinde Muliro, Tom Mboya, Argwings Kodhek, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Munyua Waiyaki, Daniel arap Moi, and many others were nationalists. Their approach regarding independence definitely differed between the “centralists” and the “revolutionizes”: the so-called “nationalists versus majimboists” debate. But very few went out of their way to engage in the politics of “fear mongering” among and between ethnic communities; and the few who did never went very far after the Kenyatta elections of 1963.

A proper reading of history shows that Kenyatta made one major mistake that pulled the nationalist rug from below his feet. This mistake was to rely on home guards and on an avaricious, upwardly mobile and politically self-centered Kikuyu middle class as his closest allies. He got divorced from the Kikuyu masses and could only bring them near by introducing a “siege mentality” following the assassination of Mboya in 1969. The oath-taking ceremonies that followed in Gatundu were only recently replicated by yet another “siege mentality” following the bangled 2007 polls and the ICC cases. If, on the basis of this “siege mentality”, power was kept in the house of Mumbi under Kenyatta, what would the fortunes of subsequent Kikuyu candidates for the presidency look like?

Second, Mwai Kibaki was, in 2000-2002 period, very conscious of this predicament. He knew how entrenched this home guard elite was in the economy of Kenya and while he could not rely on them alone to get the presidency, he could not alienate them either. He therefore carefully sought to build a nationalist coalition of opposition political parties to make his candidature possible. When the Rainbow Alliance split from Kanu during the last half of 2002, it was Raila Odinga who reinforced the logic of what Kibaki was trying to do to create a more formidable united democratic front in the form of Narc).

Kibaki and Raila transcended the “siege mentality” and made Kenyans the happiest nation on earth after the December 2002 election and the triumph of Narc. Had Kibaki not fallen sick in the first half of 2002, Kenya would have been a very different country today because he could have effectively translated the enormous legitimacy that Narc had into huge development dividends. It is unlikely that Anglo Leasing would have occurred; it is equally unlikely that constitution-making would have been sabotaged by the minions with home guard “siege mentality” hell bent on replacing Narc with a tribal party they controlled. Very soon, they started to link up with the old Kanu home guard types: and these are the ones who, faced with defeat in 2007, masterminded rigging and a bloody state repression.

Third, the repressive apparatus of the state, rather than the masses, is what such regimes that depend on “siege mentality” will rely on for maintaining political power. That is why they must always remind people that they will “win elections” no matter what the popular will is. This “reminding” seems a daily occupation, since the people must not develop the habit or hope that elections can be won by their popular vote, nor that elections are a means of getting a political mandate for developmental transformation. Elections, as it were, become a mere means for renewing tenancy in the state for personal glory.

We seem to be witnessing a presidency in which men and women with a siege mentality have captured state power, making the President himself an instrument of an authoritarian system that continues to wield undemocratic political power even against the conscious will of the President himself. In his right mind I doubt whether Uhuru would keep Isaac Hassan as the boss of the IEBC. In his right mind it is quite possible that Uhuru would see the risk of using an incompetent electoral commission to manage the next election. In his right mind it is unlikely that Uhuru would neglect concentrating on delivery of services in preference of a premature campaign to win the next elections. But remember we are not dealing with Uhuru the person: we are dealing with Uhuru as an instrument of a system long used to keeping power through politics of orchestrated exclusion and siege mentality.